Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'In Defense of Essentialism', 'Ontological Ground of Alethic Modality' and 'Remarks on the definition and nature of mathematics'

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13 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 8. Theories in Logic
To study formal systems, look at the whole thing, and not just how it is constructed in steps [Curry]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
It is untenable that mathematics is general physical truths, because it needs infinity [Curry]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Saying mathematics is logic is merely replacing one undefined term by another [Curry]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA]
An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Lewis must specify that all possibilities are in his worlds, making the whole thing circular [Shalkowski, by Sider]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA]